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The article examines the significance of 
informal economic practices, e.g. street 
vending and informal commerce, for 
young merchants from Ettadhamen, a 
neighborhood situated in the northwest-
ern periphery of the Greater Tunis area. It 
further addresses cross-border trade in 
the Tunisian-Libyan and Tunisian-Algerian 
border regions in which some of these 
merchants are indirectly involved. Periph-
eralization therefore does not imply com-
plete socio-spatial exclusion. Peripheries 
rather offer important, albeit limited pos-
sibilities, to acquire resources through 
practices that are situated in the inter-
stices between legality and illegality. As 
these possibilities often avoid state regu-
lation and control, the article also 
addresses the ambivalent nature of the 
state-society relations that shapes every-
day encounters between inhabitants and 
state agents, especially the police.
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This article examines different tactics 
among young, informal traders in Tunisia 
coping with insecurity from a peripheral 
position in urban life. Such tactics (De 
Certeau) involve multiple forms of infor-
mal economic practices, such as street 
vending and cross-border trade. These 
tactical practices must be seen in light of 
changing structural conditions, which 
have resulted in the wake of the revolution 
that followed the revolts in December 
2010 and January 2011. The article analyzes 
both everyday forms of popular agency as 
well as their relationship with the govern-
ment and the effects of state power. The 
empirical case studies result from field 
research in the popular, peri-urban neigh-
borhood of Ettadhamen, in the northwest-
ern fringes of the Tunisian capital. The 
research was conducted between 2012 
and 2013.1
Peripheries and Marginality: A Conceptual 
Approach
Although Loïc Wacquant’s concept of 
advanced marginality draws upon insights 
from the American ghetto and the French 
banlieue, i.e. zones of urban relegation 
within societies of the Global North, sev-
eral of his outlined dynamics can also be 
applied to urban peripheries in Tunisia. In 
the case of Ettadhamen, this holds for the 
territorial containment of lower and mid-
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dle class populations in a peri-urban dis-
trict that is insufficiently integrated into the 
national economy and the regular wage 
labor sector. Peripheralization is thus the 
effect of a spatially ingrained social order 
that has been produced through both 
uneven economic development and the 
governmentality of the Tunisian state. 
While this order was shaped under the 
regimes of Ben Ali and Habib Bourguiba, 
it has roots in the colonial period.
Aside from its spatial dimension, periph-
eralization and marginalization have par-
ticularly affected specific societal groups. 
In a society characterized by deeply 
entrenched inequalities, instead of main-
taining one homogenous working class, 
processes of neoliberal restructuring 
have produced fragmented forms of pre-
cariousness, social differentiation and 
exclusion. Unemployed youth, female 
household workers, casual informal work-
ers and street children belong to such 
“precarized” groups. They not only face 
unemployment or unstable and precari-
ous employment conditions. They are 
also positioned on the margins of the 
otherwise solid social security system in 
Tunisia (Destremeau; Ben Cheikh 2). 
Since they lack both formalized employ-
ment conditions and a sufficient and 
stable income, which would allow them 
to make contributions to social security 
funds, they often do not have access to 
social protection. 
Peripheries can also be spaces where 
everyday informal practices take root in 
the niches of a dominant socio-political 
order that is maintained by powerful social 
groups and their interests. Looking at 
everyday modes of tactical action, one can 
discover the creativity of peripheries and 
margins as they not only entail passive sub-
mission but also employ different forms of 
popular agency from below (Bayat, “Mar-
ginality” 19). Based on her important study 
on Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Janice Perl-
man argues that marginality constitutes a 
myth in the sense that it mistakes system-
atic exclusion and stigmatization for being 
passively marginal (131). By the same token, 
she also points out that in spite of system-
atic exclusion, different forms of internal 
socio-political organization and coopera-
tion, which are based on solidarity, exist in 
the proximity relations between friends 
and neighbors in the Favelas (142). Margin-
alization and peripheralization are not only 
a curse but also as an opportunity where 
excluded groups can survive and over-
come economic constraints (Bayat, “Mar-
ginality” 14). The constitution of the mar-
ginal or the peripheral does not 
necessarily follow the logic of total exclu-
sion (Yúdice 214). Despite their marginal-
ized positions, peripheries are often sites 
where the state’s power and its borders are 
contested and reconfigured and where 
informal channels, parallel networks and 
transnational economic flows perpetuate 
connections with the global world econ-
omy (Roitman 195). Albeit on a small scale, 
the empirical cases of informal merchants 
in the wake of the Tunisian revolution will 
demonstrate that informal practices can 
persist despite the center’s dominance. 
Although these informal practices primar-
ily aim at coping with the insecurities, risks 
and constraints that result from a periph-
eral position, they produce forms of surviv-
alism and self-organization that largely 
avoid dominant structures and institutions. 
Such informal economic practices and the 
formal system, which is to a greater extent 
structured by official rules, exist side by 
side in Ettadhamen.
Ettadhamen: Contested Urban Space in 
the Periphery of Greater Tunis
Ettadhamen was created under the rule of 
Bourguiba in 1966 as a public program 
that provided social housing for rural 
migrants and was given the name 
al-taḍāmun (“solidarity”). Between 1975 
and 1984 it witnessed considerable popu-
lation growth due to the influx of intra-
urban migrants who came from the 
Medina and from gourbivilles (“spontane-
ous agglomerations”) inside the city of 
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Tunis (ARRU 24). This development was in 
contrast to the situation of older informal 
neighborhoods that had come into being 
through rural exodus. It was thus the result 
of a redistribution of populations within 
the capital (Laroussi 45). Most of these 
residential migrants (56.4 percent) were 
also former rural migrants who originated 
from northwestern Tunisia, a traditional 
agricultural region, which contains the 
High Tell Mountains along with Beja, Jen-
douba and Le Kef as the most important 
cities (Chabbi, “L’Habitat spontané” 25; 
“Une Nouvelle forme” 90; “Urbanisation 
spontanée” 181). In view of this historical 
background, Ettadhamen serves as an 
example for the proliferation of “fringe 
urban communities” (Ali and Rieker 3) 
whose members were situated in the 
peripheries of larger cities negotiating 
and reproducing the rural-urban nexus 
(2). In the late 1970s, the insecure condi-
tions of habitation in the neighborhood 
prompted the Tunisian state agencies to 
implement a number of urban planning 
projects that aimed to regulate real estate 
and improve infrastructure. These projects 
were partially financed through a credit 
from the World Bank (Chabbi, “Pratiques 
et logiques”). Ettadhamen and Douar 
Hicher were the priority zones of these 
policy efforts that now put a greater 
emphasis on the development of the 
republic’s zones d’ombre (“shadow 
zones”) and the integration of marginal-
ized, shaʿ abī (“popular”) classes. However, 
despite significant infrastruc tural improve-
ments, problems such as unemployment, 
crime, insufficient housing, and the socio-
spatial segregation of the neighborhood 
not only persisted but rather increased 
(ARRU 55).
In 2012, the population of Ettadhamen in 
the Ariana governorate was 142,000 while 
the surrounding neighborhoods Douar 
Hicher and Mnihla counted 157,000 
inhabitants. In total, these three neighbor-
hoods comprised 300,000 inhabitants, 
which made it one of the most populated 
peri-urban agglomerations in North Africa 
(Chabbi, “Une Nouvelle forme” 168). In 
January 2011, it was one of the first neigh-
borhoods within the capital where mobi-
lizations of youth, most of whom were 
unemployed, targeted local police sta-
tions. The protests also entailed acts of 
pillage and sabotage. The three major 
industrial sites and the maison des jeunes 
(“youth center”) were burned down by 
protesters. Moreover, a number of stores 
were looted and destroyed. However, in 
the aftermath of the protests, local youth 
took responsibility for security in the 
neighborhood by organizing local com-
mittees. These informal patrols called lijān 
shaʿabiyya (“popular committees”) used 
the already existing networks in the neigh-
borhood (Allal 59). They temporarily 
adopted a policing function in an effort to 
control the neighborhood’s unsafe condi-
tions. Ever since the fall of the regime 
enforcement of both security measures 
and public services that should be pro-
vided by local authorities such as the 
police and the municipality have been 
neglected. Self-organization and local 
networks, for example organizations 
belonging to the Salafi movement, consti-
tute parallel structures of social regu lation 
and control. Clashes between young, 
unemployed people and security forces 
have given Ettadhamen the label of a law-
less zone where control mechanisms by 
state agents and institutions are 
limited (Belhassine). However, since 
August 2013, when the organization Ansar 
al-Sharia was classified as a terrorist 
group, security measures have been rein-
forced and several activists belonging to 
the militant branch of the Salafi move-
ment have been arrested.2
Ettadhamen is predominantly a residential 
area due to modest infrastructure and lack 
of industrial production (ENDA 12). Spatial 
segregation and the proliferation of infor-
mal housing structure through illegal sub-
divisions did not favor the attraction of 
economic investments. Therefore, as pub-
lic sector jobs were inaccessible for the 
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #05–2015
FOCUS 68
majority, the neighborhood Ettadhamen-
Douar Hicher had already witnessed the 
dispersion of informal activities and ser-
vices by 1980. By 1995, a rising number of 
households had invested in commercial 
activities. Many transformed one room of 
their house into an economic establish-
ment for a particular kind of activity, mostly 
commerce-related. Most of the retail 
stores and commercial establishments are 
now concentrated around the main 
streets, 105th Street, 106th Street, Ibn 
Khaldun Street and the road leading from 
Tunis to Bizerte. 105th Street is character-
ized by a great number of informal side 
streets and ambulant vendors who mostly 
come from the vicinity. They predomi-
nantly sell vegetables, fruits, decor, house-
hold equipments, electronic appliances 
and friperie (very cheap, second-hand 
clothing which is distributed in bales). 
Local clients frequently buy from these 
vendors because they can negotiate 
cheaper prices. The small stores primarily 
offer low-value goods of modest quality 
that are suitable to the resources of the 
low- income strata in a popular neighbor-
hood. If casual labor has regressed, com-
merce activities have greatly increased in 
the neighborhood, especially among the 
younger generation. According to a 2014 
survey among 714 youth aged between 
18-34 from Douar Hicher and Ettadhamen, 
27.8 percent were self-employed as arti-
sans or small merchants, and 20.3 percent 
were employed in commerce (Interna-
tional Alert 11). Moreover, the informal 
economy plays a significant role in Ettad-
hamen (Lamloum and Ben Zina 15). Like in 
many other popular neighborhoods infor-
mal commercial activities are connected 
to translocal circuits and flows of eco-
nomic goods that extend to other areas 
and markets in the country.
The police in Ettadhamen tolerate these 
activities, which are illegal in terms of state 
regulations, and turn a blind eye towards 
the fact that these informal vendors do not 
hold the proper licenses to legalize their 
business (Police officer). One of the rea-
sons why the state, to a great extent, toler-
ated informal economic activities, specifi-
cally informal commerce, before the 
Tunisian revolution in 2011, can be seen in 
its determination to depoliticize and 
appease poor populations in order to 
contain social unrest (Meddeb, “La Tunisie” 
73). Although informal practices under-
mined the rule of law and bureaucratic 
norms, they were mostly in accordance 
with the logic of the police state and the 
security order. As Béatrice Hibou points 
out, the state’s laissez-faire approach was 
one of the disciplinary techniques of 
power that was deeply entrenched in the 
patronage-system under Ben Ali (187). 
However, to the Tunisian regime tolerating 
informal commerce also implied control-
ling it. Since the ruling family clan of the 
Trabelsi was keen on siphoning off profits 
for itself, the Tunisian authorities occasion-
ally intervened. The municipal police in 
Tunis would carry out raids against street 
vendors and confiscate their products or 
take away scales from merchants selling 
fruits and vegetables if they were not will-
ing to pay bribes. Ibrahim, a 23 years old 
retail trader working in the store of his par-
ents on 105th Street in Ettadhamen refers 
to the situation prior to January 14, 2011:
Q: How did the authorities deal with 
independent commerce before the 
revolution?
A: Commerce was allowed, but the Tra-
belsi family intervened in it. They were 
the big ones who delivered all kinds of 
goods to the other small merchants. 
They were the ones who imported 
these kinds of goods. From China. 
They also demanded bribes (rashwa). 
First they were the ones who sold you 
their goods. And then they would also 
demand bribe money. They were big 
traders. We didn’t deal with them di-
rectly. The police demanded the bribes 
every month. (Ibrahim)
The revolution brought about a greater 
degree of freedom in public life. The 
retrenchment of the security apparatus 
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allowed for the expansion of informal 
commerce as the enormous spreading of 
street vendors, many of them very young, 
in public places, e.g. squares, big avenues 
and around mosques, demonstrates (Ben 
Mahmoud). Controversial discussions 
about how to regulate the informal econ-
omy have been occurring ever since the 
fall of the regime in January 2011 and the 
beginning of the political transition pro-
cess that followed. While most state offi-
cials see informality as a necessary evil, 
tradesmen from the formal sector com-
plain about the negative effects on their 
own businesses; although, they some-
times benefit from the informal distribu-
tion networks as well. Since May 2011, the 
official policy of the government aims to 
curb informal activities due to their nega-
tive effects on the productive sectors and 
the price level (SlateAfrique). On August 
26 2011, the ministry of the interior passed 
a resolution that banned illegal street 
vending starting in September 2011. Any 
street vendor selling goods would be 
forced to pay a fine (Gamha). However, 
restrictive laws and regulations are often 
not implemented on the ground. 
Everyday Struggles of “Getting By:” Indi-
vidual Cases
The following cases are meant to illumi-
nate the everyday struggles of local inhab-
itants from Ettadhamen as they work to 
make a living (al-maʿīsha) and to secure 
their economic survival at the urban 
periphery. At the same time, they point to 
the ambivalent relationship with the state, 
in particular its local manifestations such 
as the municipality (al-baladaiyya), fiscal 
authorities (qabāḍa māliyya), the police 
(al-ḥākim) or the employment center 
(maktab al-tashghīl). At the local level of 
peripheral areas, the boundaries between 
state and society are often more porous 
and permeable (Mitchell), which may lead 
to both immediate conflict and mediation. 
Despite the fact that they occupy marginal 
positions and belong to a marginalized 
population, the actors are capable of 
developing informal tactics that use the 
few economic opportunities available in a 
spatially segregated and economically rel-
egated neighborhood at the periphery. 
Furthermore they draw from access to 
local networks of solidarity based on kin-
ship, friendship and vicinity. The high 
significance of work as a fundamental 
social value and as an obligatory source of 
revenue explains why many young people 
resort to informal activities, even if the 
absorptive capacities of the informal 
economy are thereby increasingly 
stretched. 
Economic Survival in Face of State Control 
in Everyday Life
The situation of street vendors in 
Ettadhamen, like in other neighborhoods 
and informal markets of the city, has 
always been highly insecure, especially 
under the regime of Ben Ali. Informal 
vending circuits are widespread across 
the city since they allow for the circulation 
of perish able foodstuffs such as fruits and 
vegetables or low quality goods, for exam-
ple cheap clothing and household equip-
ment, which the formal circuits cannot 
easily provide at such localities. While 
street vending is often practiced without 
any kind of formalization or licensing and 
provides a source of income for those who 
are unqualified and do not have a chance 
to find a regular and formal job, it involves 
the risk of facing controls by the munici-
pality police.3 The French expression for 
street vendors vendeurs à la sauvette 
(“vendors on the run”), which is widely 
used in Tunisia, alludes to this risk and the 
need to run away from the police. The 
account of Abderrahim shows the severe 
impact of such controls on the livelihood 
of a self-employed, informal merchant. 
Being the son of a construction worker 
from a town in northern Tunisia, he went to 
primary school until the age of 14. He then 
quit school and started searching for a job 
due to financial constraints within the fam-
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ily. However, he could only find jobs as a 
ʿāmil yaumī (“casual laborer”) and was 
unemployed most of the time before he 
started working as a painter. One of his 
colleagues put him into touch with a pri-
vate company employing 45 workers. 
Abderrahim obtained a permanent 
employment contract, but it did not 
include social security benefits. Through 
this job, he earned a monthly salary of 
480 DT—slightly above the SMIG4—for 
working eight hours per day.5 However, 
when he became exhausted through this 
kind of hard, physical work he searched 
for an alternative. He invested the savings 
from his job (500 DT) into the creation of 
a street vending business for selling fruits. 
Every other day he rented an informal 
transport car and went to the wholesale 
market in Bir Qasʿa in the southern sub-
urb of the capital Ben Arous, where he 
bought peaches, bananas, apples and 
almonds in order to sell them on a public 
square near Ettadhamen. However, he 
always feared controls by the authorities 
which, before January 2011, regularly 
interfered in this kind of informal, non- 
licensed street vending. The police of the 
municipality came four times to disperse 
his vending stall and confiscate his goods 
and scales. Knowing that the police 
sometimes accepted bribes he unsuc-
cessfully tried to stop them by offering 
money: “What else can I do if not this kind 
of work? Where can I work if not here? 
Why did they come to disperse? It’s not 
reasonable” (Abderrahim). Afterwards, 
Abderrahim was compelled to start from 
scratch again and spend his savings on 
acquiring new equipment and new 
goods. He mentioned that since the 
regime collapsed, there were no more 
raids by the municipality police. However, 
it has become much more difficult for him 
to make a living through this activity 
because of an overall higher price level 
in the country and because of a decrease 
in profit margins. Abderrahim’s case 
shows how visible informal practices, 
which take place openly in public space 
and which the authorities usually tolerate, 
can at certain instances be subdued by 
controls and repressive measures. His 
perspective also reveals that local 
actors consider these practices, which 
are illegal according to official law, as 
legitimate or licit for the simple reason 
that they constitute their sole source of 
income. Therefore, the degree of tol-
eration by the authorities has increased 
since the regime’s collapse. Controls, 
bribe extortions, dispossessions and 
other repressive measures have been 
reduced but have not completely van-
ished. Ibrahim, the retail trader on 
105th Street, explains what he thinks 
are the reasons for this changed policy 
vis-à-vis street vendors:
Because of the economic situation, 
the state does not persecute them 
very much. Unemployment has incre-
ased after the revolution. It’s better 
they do street vending than stealing 
things. There are priorities and there 
are concessions. The state allows for 
intiṣāb fauḍawī (“street vending”), so 
that crime and thefts won’t increase in 
the country. Before the revolution the-
re was more control on street vending. 
It was part of the suppressive regime 
under Ben Ali. All the people had to be 
afraid of the police. (Ibrahim)
Between Control and Laissez-Faire: Stakes 
and Risks of Cross-Border Trade 
While the majority of street vendors do 
not hold a permit and thus occupy a com-
pletely informal status, most of the retail 
traders usually possess both a license 
from the municipality for their store and a 
permit for paying taxes. However, the 
goods they commercialize are often not 
formally acquired but rather originate 
from informal circuits that are connected 
to trans-local networks of cross-border 
trade and smuggling. The merchants from 
popular neighborhoods in the periphery 
of Greater Tunis—among them street ven-
dors, ambulant vendors and retail trad-
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ers—usually acquire these smuggled 
goods at local markets such as Sidi 
Boumendil or Melassine in Tunis. Some 
also travel to markets in cities close to the 
border, for example Ben Guerdane near 
the Tunisian-Libyan border and Kasserine 
near the Tunisian-Algerian border.6 At 
these markets they purchase cheap mer-
chandise that is mostly produced in 
China and Southeast Asia (Meddeb, 
Courir ou mourir 36). In 1988, the open-
ing of the frontier between Libya and 
Tunisia at the border posts, Ras Jedir and 
Dhhiba, considerably accentuated the 
exchanges of both economic goods and 
human beings between the two coun-
tries. This holds in particular for the activ-
ities of ambulant merchants, which has 
led to an explosion of informal com-
merce in the Tunisian-Libyan border 
region (governorates of Medenine and 
Tataouine) due to the importation of 
cheap manufactured products into 
Tunisia (tobacco, electronic devices, car 
equipment, beauty products, household 
equipment, decor, clothing). Having 
arrived on Tunisian soil, the goods are 
later distributed by wholesalers via 
extensive networks to informal markets—
so-called souk libya—all across the coun-
try (Boubakri 242-43). These cross-bor-
der exchanges can reach outstanding 
monetary value. In 2013, the annual value 
of goods loaded at the point of purchase 
that passed through the border post, Ras 
Jedir, was estimated at 467.47 millions 
DT (Ayadi et al. 17). As for the Tunisian-
Algerian border region, smuggling has 
greatly increased since 2011, in particular 
the trafficking of Algerian fuels which are 
approximately ten times cheaper than 
Tunisian fuels (21).
Ibrahim refers to this ambivalent legal 
situation of commercializing goods that 
originate from cross-border trade in the 
case of his parents’ retail business. When 
he was 23, he successfully passed the 
baccalaureate exam and pursued his 
studies at the University of La Manouba. 
After three months of studying, he quit 
university because he was unsatisfied 
with the studying conditions and the low 
value of the certificate that would have 
left him with poor job perspectives. 
Instead, he started working in a retail 
store on one of the major avenues in 
Ettadhamen, which is owned by his par-
ents, and sold household equipment and 
decor materials to local clients from the 
neighborhood. He points out that before 
the Tunisian revolution he went to acquire 
the goods in Ben Guerdane. However, 
since the civil war in Libya in 2011 and the 
resulting deterioration of security condi-
tions in the border regions, the supply of 
available goods has decreased, prices 
for smuggled goods have risen consider-
ably and border controls have intensified 
due to the proliferation of the illegal 
arms trade.7 Therefore, his family prefers 
to purchase the merchandise in Algeria 
or from the informal market in Kasserine. 
Ibrahim explains how the authorities reg-
ulate this form of retail trading business 
and how he deals with police controls:
Q: Do you have a permit for this store? 
A: Yes, we have one. A ruḫṣa (“license”) 
from the municipality and a batinda 
(“permit”) for paying taxes. We pay 
taxes on the income. I give you an 
example. If your income is 2,000 DT you 
pay a percentage of it as a tax on your 
income. The police of the municipality 
or the price control can ask: “Do you 
have a license and bills?” If not, they 
confiscate your goods, saying that they 
are stolen because there is no what we 
call legal origin. They are considered 
stolen or smuggled goods. That’s why 
you need the bills. If you buy goods 
from over there [Algeria] you ask them 
for a bill. The police waits at the cus-
toms. If you don’t have bills they 
demand bribes from you. And the bills 
don’t even have any value. You bring 
back the bills for two things. The other 
one is the murāqaba iqtiṣādiyya (“eco-
nomic control”) of the store. Someone 
from customs comes here and carries 
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out a control. They ask for the bills for 
different goods. So you have to give 
them the bills. If you don’t have a bill 
they will assume that the goods are 
either stolen or smuggled. (Ibrahim)
As Ibrahim insinuates, false documenta-
tion can be used as a means to give infor-
mal practices the appearance of legality. 
Similar to wholesale traders, who possess 
formal enterprises and deal with huge 
quantities of imported goods, retail trad-
ers partially operate in informally. Their 
businesses are formalized, but they fre-
quently engage in informal practices such 
as irregular acquisitions of goods, non-
declaration and tax evasion (Laroussi 182). 
Informal activities related to cross-border 
trade constitute both regional border 
economies and the networks of distribu-
tion and consumption of goods that reach 
across the republic. They are situated in an 
interstice between legality and illegality.8 
Cross-border trade is considered legiti-
mate in the eyes of the actors involved, 
who use it as a means to assure their 
khobza (“daily bread”), their economic 
security and a decent standard of living 
(Meddeb, Courir ou mourir 43). Although 
cross-border trade represents, for the 
majority, an economy of “getting by” and 
coping with insecurity rather than financial 
accumulation, it may also offer the chance 
to achieve social upward mobility. It is thus 
less about opposing state regulation in 
general and rather more about the 
demand for the right to have an alterna-
tive to the state’s monopoly (49). This, 
however, also implies that the border is 
not a marginalized, segregated space but 
rather a source of revenue and subsis-
tence in the country’s peripheries (44). 
It is often not easy to distinguish between 
the different actors involved in the net-
works of cross-border trade, i.e. mer-
chants, traffickers, transporters, carriers, 
consumers or simple travelers. In the case 
of the merchants from Ettadhamen many 
of them are part of the numerous street 
vendors, small, itinerant traders and oc-
casional merchants with modest finan-
cial means called fourmis (“ants”) (Med-
deb, Courir ou mourir 59; World Bank 4). 
These small merchants travel individually 
or as part of an organized group trip to 
informal markets in the Tunisian-Libyan 
border region, where they carry out their 
purchases (Meddeb, “Courir ou mourir” 
55). At these markets, they can seize 
spontaneous opportunities for lucrative 
sales offers. They mostly buy electronic 
devices, household equipment or cloth-
ing. The latter can be divided into fripes 
and high quality, fashionable prêt-à-por-
ter outfits, which are sold on the souk lib-
ya for relatively attractive prices. Usama, a 
thirty years old ambulant merchant from 
Ettadhamen, describes how such trips to 
Ben Guerdane are arranged and how he 
organizes his trading activity:
For buying the products, I always went 
to Ben Guerdane. The first time I went 
there was for three days. I went together 
with the other merchants, with a group. 
They rent a car, they go there and come 
back. Everyone spends the money he or 
she has and brings back the products. 
There are some people who organize 
trips to Ben Guerdane – people who 
offer you a bus and a driver to bring you 
there for a special sum. I paid 40 DT. 
Roundtrip. I got to know these mer-
chants here in Hay Ettadhamen. For 
going to Ben Guerdane, you leave in 
the evening and you arrive there the 
morning after. You go to the big market 
over there, and you buy your goods. I 
always bought furniture, electronic 
devices, appliances that you need for 
houses, for example stereo systems, 
cooking systems, ovens, microwaves, 
sometimes also washing machines. All 
the things that you need for the house. 
People would give me money and ask 
me to bring back something for them, 
for example a washing machine. When-
ever I went I made a list of the things 
that I needed to bring back. A friend or 
a neighbor would come and tell me: 
“Buy me a washing machine or a micro-
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wave.” I brought them the things and 
they paid me afterwards. I buy the wash-
ing machine for 60 DT and I sell it for 
100 DT. Of course, I bought other things 
at the same time, for example clothing. 
I keep those goods in the house. I went 
many, many times to Ben Guerdane. 
More than thirty times. (Usama)
These kinds of commercial trips also bear 
the risk of getting caught in controls by 
the police, by customs or by the garde na-
tionale. Under the regime of Ben Ali, the 
organizers of these group journeys had to 
legitimate such trips through licenses ob-
tained from local cells of the ruling single 
party RCD (Meddeb, Courir ou mourir 
174). Those who travelled without any 
form of legalization needed to be pre-
pared to bribe police and custom agents. 
Usama recalls:
Before, I always had to pay bribes on 
the way back to Tunis. All the merchants 
have to pay. They give a sum of money 
to the custom service, so that they let 
you pass with your goods. Each time a 
sum like 300 DT. For all of the mer-
chants. Me, I pay something like 50 DT 
each time, sometimes 100 DT. It hap-
pens on the road from Ben Guerdane 
to Tunis. Because when you leave Ben 
Guerdane, you don’t talk to the custom 
service. The patrols stop you on the 
road. Sometimes they even stop you in 
Kairouan. (Usama)
As Usama points out, controls and bribe 
extortions have decreased since the 
regime collapsed. Personalized exchange 
relations based on a clientelistic rapport 
between transporters or smugglers and 
state agents minimize the risk of having to 
face imposed penalties. The interaction 
between small merchants and state agents 
is ambivalent. Rather than following gen-
eralized, pre-defined rules, it is a negoti-
ated bargain that results from face-to-face 
encounters. On the side of the authorities 
it involves both a strategy of laissez-faire 
as well as moments of control and inter-
vention in order to partially reinstate state 
power. In the interactions among mer-
chants, transporters and smugglers per-
sonal connections are built through 
repeated transactions in order to foster 
trust and overcome the risk of being 
cheated. 
Conclusions
The case studies have illustrated multiple 
tactical modes of how informal merchants 
from Ettadhamen cope with insecurity at 
the urban periphery. They point to both 
challenges as well as possibilities to turn 
constraints into opportunities. Peripheral-
ization, therefore, does not imply a com-
plete socio-spatial exclusion but rather an 
integration under unequal terms. Periph-
eries bear some potential to gain 
au tonomy and acquire resources, even if 
in most cases these potentials are very lim-
ited. This holds true for those local street 
and ambulant vendors in Ettadhamen, 
who circulate across the urban system of 
Tunis or who travel to border regions in 
order to seek opportunities for purchasing 
merchandise. Such potential opportuni-
ties, however, come with high risks and 
new constraints as these merchants have 
to struggle with decreasing profit margins, 
limited capital for investment and controls 
by police and customs officers.
The informal practices that inhabitants 
from Ettadhamen engage in are situated 
on the margins of legality; the limited 
degree of state intervention in Ettadha-
men or the porosity of the borders to 
Libya and Algeria can be seen as repre-
senting the peripheralization of state 
power, which thereby allows for the prolif-
eration of informal practices positioned in 
an interstice between legality and illegal-
ity. The relation between the state or its 
local manifestations and the informal mer-
chants are ambivalent. They may shift from 
one moment to another when external 
conditions change and arrangements are 
disturbed. Despite a weakening of the 
state apparatus in the wake of January 
2011, it is far from being powerless as its 
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agents continue to occasionally intervene 
in informal practices. Since 2013 the coun-
try has actually witnessed a gradual rein-
forcement of security measures, especially 
in the border regions. Even the most sub-
ordinated actors of the informal economy, 
young ambulant merchants or street ven-
dors, who conceive state power at times 
as absent, inert, arbitrary or repressive, still 
interact in their everyday circulations with 
the state’s local representatives and 
agents. Informal merchants do not neces-
sarily refuse its authority in principle. Many 
are willing to abide by the law, but they 
contest specific modes of power exertion 
(controls, confiscations, bribe extortions) 
or demand the re-adjustment of legal reg-
ulations, so that they can carry out prac-
tices that they consider to be licit in view 
of their material conditions. In particular, 
when these conditions are put at risk, sub-
jectivities of dissent and even social unrest 
are likely to occur. For many informal mer-
chants, inclusion into the formal system 
can be desirable if it provides access to 
social protection. However, it is only a via-
ble option if it does not entail a total loss 
of autonomy and deprivation of vital 
opportunities, which semi-legal practices 
in peripheral areas can offer. 
These microscopic social struggles over 
access to resources, although not directly 
linked to moments of open protest, con-
stitute an everyday socio-spatial context in 
the urban peripheries from which local 
micro-politics can emerge.
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3 According to a survey by 
the Tunisian Association for 
Management and Social 
Stability (TAMSS) and the 
Global Fairness Initiative 
(GFI), nearly 70 percent 
of independent, informal 
workers do not hold a 
license, and only 8 percent 
declared that they pay taxes 
(municipal or other taxes) 
(Global Fairness Initiative 42).




1 The data of this article 
consists of semi-structured 
qualitative interviews, which 
I conducted with informal 
workers and merchants in 
Ettadhamen in June and 
July 2012. More recent 
developments cannot be 
taken into account in this 
article.
2 Salafis are part of local, 
territorialized networks of 
the neighborhood (ḥūma), 
which play an important 
role in organizing informal 
commerce. Due to space 
constraints, however, their 
role cannot be addressed in 
detail here.
5 In July 2012, the SMIG 
was 320 DT (Business 
News). According to a study 
conducted by TAMSS and 
GFI with 1,203 informal 
workers from different 
regions in Tunisia, more than 
two-thirds (72.5 percent) of 
the households of informal 
workers earn a monthly 
income of less than 600 DT, 
15 percent earn between 600 
and 799 DT, 22.3 percent 
between 400 and 599 DT, 
35.7 percent between 200 
and 399 DT and 14.4 percent 
earn less than 200 DT (Global 
Fairness Initiative 13).
6 Unlike Ben Guerdane 
near the Tunisian-Libyan 
border or Kasserine near the 
Tunisian-Algerian border the 
neighborhood Ettadhamen, 
situated in the northwestern 
periphery of the Greater 
Tunis area, does not rank 
among the most significant 
centers for smuggling 
circuits. However, several 
informal merchants are 
directly or indirectly involved 
in informal transport and 
distribution networks. The 
smuggling of illegal goods 
such as drugs and arms is not 
dealt with in this article.
7 Smuggling of both narcotics 
and arms existed already 
before January 14th but 
has increased considerably 
since that time, because 
controls by police, custom 
officers and garde nationale 
have loosened or even 
disappeared in some areas 
of the border regions 
(International Crisis Group 
15). 
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